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When a ruling by a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
regional director determined that Northwestern University foot-
ball players who receive athletic scholarships are employees'
and therefore eligible to vote in a union-representation election,
the multi-billion dollar enterprise known as Division I football
was rocked to its foundation. Whether this ruling is upheld on
appeal or overturned, college football will not be unionized be-
cause many players do not fall under the jurisdiction of the
NLRB.2
But this unionizing effort will not end there. It is part of a
broad array of player lawsuits to challenge the National Colle-
giate Athletic Association (NCAA).3 These athletes are already
following in the path of National Football League (NFL) players,
who eventually sued their league under the Sherman Act after
their disastrous 1987 strike.4 From 1992 to 2011, those players
negotiated a series of favorable antitrust settlement agreements
that superseded in importance their collective bargaining under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).5
f Professor, School of Labor and Employment Relations and College of Law, Uni-
versity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I dedicate this Essay to the memory of my
mother, Carol LeRoy. I also extend appreciation to Margaret Schilt.
I Northwestern University, Employer, and College Athletes Players Association
(CAPA), Petitioner, 2014 WL 1246914, *1 (NLRB 2014).
2 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 USC § 151-69, excludes "any indi-
vidual . . . or any individual employed by . . . any other person who is not an employer as
herein defined." NLRA § 2(3), 29 USC § 152(3). The term "employer" excludes "any State
or political subdivision thereof." NLRA § 2(2), 29 USC § 152(2). Thus, players at public
universities cannot form a union under the NLRA.
3 See Tom Farrey, Jeffrey Kessler Files against NCAA, ESPN College Sports
(ESPN Mar 18, 2014), online at http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/10620388/anti
-trust-claim-filed-jeffrey-kessler-challenges-ncaa-amateur-model (visited June 7, 2014).
4 See Paul D. Staudohar, The Football Strike of 1987: The Question of Free Agency,
111 Monthly Labor Rev 26, 31 (1988).
5 See White v National Football League, 766 F Supp 2d 941, 944 n 1 (D Minn 2011)
("The parties amended [their agreement] in 1993, 1996, 2002 and 2006.").
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Ironically, to achieve this success the NFL players decerti-
fied their union so that they could avoid the duty to bargain un-
der the NLRA.6 During this time, there was no legal relevance
as to whether NFL players were employees under federal labor
law-all that mattered was that their league had imposed un-
reasonable free agency restrictions that caused monetary damag-
es. A jury determined that the NFL's restrictions went beyond
what was necessary to maintain competitive balance among
teams, and the court thus enjoined these restraints.7 The result-
ing Stipulations and Settlement Agreement substituted for a col-
lective bargaining agreement.8
This backdrop helps to inform my counterintuitive analysis.
The positions and arguments on either side of the player-
unionization question are uninformed by a broader understand-
ing of how collective bargaining has disappointed professional
athletes and become an unlikely refuge for wealthy owners. Crit-
ics of the NCAA are legion and appropriately condemn college
football for exploiting players without paying them.9 They tend
to assume, however, that a union will improve conditions for
players. 10
Meanwhile, Northwestern has appealed the regional direc-
tor's ruling," while the NCAA president has appeared on Face
the Nation to oppose a players' union.12 Other critics of the player-
unionization concept worry that paying college football players
will: take money away from nonrevenue sports, especially those
for women; complete the transformation of Division I sports to
6 See Powell v National Football League, 764 F Supp 1351, 1354 (D Minn 1991),
citing Powell v National Football League, 888 F2d 559 (8th Cir 1989) (explaining that the
executive committee of the players' union, after considering the Eighth Circuit's earlier de-
cision, decided to abandon collective bargaining on December 5, 1989). The players did
this again in 2011. See Brady v National Football League, 644 F3d 661, 663 (8th Cir
2011).
7 See McNeil v National Football League, 1992 WL 315292, *1 (D Minn).
8 See Brady, 644 F3d at 665.
9 See generally, for example, Nicolas A. Novy, "The Emperor Has No Clothes". The
NCAA's Last Chance as the Middle Man in College Athletics, 21 Sports L J 227 (2014).
10 See, for example, Northwestern Players Win Ruling at NLRB, Take Next Step
toward Unionization, Sports Illustrated Campus Union, (Sports Illustrated Mar 27,
2014), online at http://college-football.si.com/2014/03/26/northwestern-nlrb-union-kain
-colter (visited June 7, 2014) ("These players are not only going to be owed salary.
They're going to be owed health benefits, and potentially pension or retirement [benefits].").
11 See Michael Sanserino, College Athletes Hit Milestone in Campaign to Form a
Union, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette A-1 (Mar 27, 2014).
12 See John Feinstein, Northwestern Players Are Not Demanding to Be Paid; They
Are Demanding a Voice, Wash Post D9 (Apr 1, 2014).
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professional competition; create income tax liability for the ath-
letes; and open the door to unionizing other college sports.13
Each of these predictions overlooks the antitrust alternative
to the player-unionization question that I pose here. These reac-
tions are understandable, but they ignore the NFL's paradoxical
embrace of collective bargaining and fail to consider why NFL
players have disbanded their union-not once, but twice.14
This Essay does not take sides, make moralistic judgments,
or reformulate hackneyed arguments. Instead, I analyze how
antitrust has inverted the preferences of a sports league and
players' union so that now, the league prefers collective bargain-
ing and the union resists it. I show how the players' union
turned to antitrust when collective bargaining failed the union
and also how a federal district court undermined the NFL's
freedom to impose terms on its players. Like their Northwestern
counterparts, NFL players formed a union to promote their eco-
nomic interests. But at the bargaining table their union has
been inferior to the more powerful league.1
My ultimate conclusion is that a "labor dispute," as defined
by the Norris-LaGuardia Act,16 would benefit the NCAA because
it would divest federal courts of jurisdiction to hear an antitrust
case. 7 In the long run, antitrust liability poses a bigger threat to
NCAA interests than does player unionization. Therefore, it is in
the NCAA's interest to: embrace the union-representation pro-
cess;18 engage in "hard bargaining," particularly because its bar-
gaining strength is pitted against the weak bargaining power of
college athletes;9 and anticipate implementing the terms and
conditions of a collective bargaining agreement. 20 By taking
13 See id.
14 See note 6 and text accompanying note 61.
15 See text accompanying note 61.
16 29 USC § 101 et seq.
17 The law denies federal courts jurisdiction "to issue any restraining order or tem-
porary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dis-
pute." 29 USC § 104.
18 See Ryan Walters, Provoking Preemption: Why State Laws Protecting the Right to
a Secret Ballot Election Are Preempted by the NLRA, 52 Santa Clara L Rev 1031, 1036-
38 (2012).
19 See Plymouth Stamping Division, Eltec Corp, and Local 985, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) 286 NLRB 890, 896
(1987) ("[I]t is not unlawful for a party to take advantage of a shift in economic strength
in order to seek more favorable contract terms."). See also text accompanying note 94.
20 Brown v Pro Football, Inc, 518 US 231 (1996), is an analogous case wherein the
NFL unilaterally implemented a developmental-squad program that paid every player a
mere $1,000 weekly salary.
46 [81:44
3
LeRoy: How a Labor Dispute Would Help the NCAA
Published by Chicago Unbound, 2017
How a "Labor Dispute" Would Help the NCAA
these actions, the NCAA would create a "labor dispute" with
players-and, according to the strictures of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and the Clayton Act,21 such a dispute would
shield it from an injunction and potent antitrust remedies.
I. THE ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR LAW FOR
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES
A. Baseball
What makes professional sports so compelling? Baseball
was the first sport to successfully address this question. Its crea-
tors realized that teams must not only employ exceptionally tal-
ented athletes but must also create intense competition. To
translate this model into a commercial success, the league strict-
ly limited the number of teams. 2 2 Moreover, its governing body
imposed severe limits on player mobility in a closed labor mar-
ket.23 This combination allocated talent across teams. In essence,
baseball thrived by combining a product monopoly with a labor
market monopsony that depressed wages. 24
In a quirk of fate, baseball's anticompetitive model survived
antitrust lawsuits. This odyssey began when the National
League snuffed out a rival, the Federal League.25 After the Bal-
timore franchise was left without a league, it sued the National
League under the Sherman Act.26 The team won treble damages,
but lost on the league's appeal.27 More significant for the present
controversy, the Supreme Court, in affirming, ruled that base-
ball is exempt from antitrust law because the business is con-
fined to a baseball field.28 Therefore, the game is never in inter-
state commerce, even with ancillary commerce that crosses a
21 38 Stat 730 (1914).
22 See National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc, 269 F 681, 682-83 (DC Cir 1920).
23 See Roger I. Abrams, Legal Bases: Baseball and the Law 15-16 (Temple 1998)
(detailing the National League's adoption of the reserve clause in 1879 in response to
rising player salaries).
24 For an explanation of the reserve clause, see Comment, Organized Baseball and
the Law, 46 Yale L J 1386, 1386-87 (1937) ("Since the contract entered into in each suc-
ceeding season will have a similar provision, the player is really signing for the duration
of his baseball life.").
25 See National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 269 F at 682.
26 Id.
27 See id at 682, 688.
28 See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc v National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 US 200, 208 (1922).
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border, such as ticket purchasers, kegs of beer, crates of hot
dogs, and the like. The Supreme Court has stubbornly clung to
this ruling.29 The vast commercialization of the sport has done
nothing to change its view that baseball is beyond the purview of
antitrust law.30
Although the baseball experience is odd, it laid the founda-
tion for players to improve their pay by forming a union and
bargaining collectively. Baseball players gained partial relief
from the reserve clause in an arbitration ruling after pitchers
filed a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement. 31 Lat-
er, other players used arbitration to challenge collusion by own-
ers who shunned them in the free agent market.32 Baseball play-
ers also used a traditional labor tactic-a strike-when Major
League Baseball (MLB) tried to implement the National Bas-
ketball Association's (NBA) type of salary cap and revenue shar-
ing structure. 33 The players successfully resisted MLB's aggres-
sive attempts to eliminate salary arbitration and consolidate
player contract negotiations under one central entity (removing
teams as bidders and employers).34
B. Basketball
In sharp contrast to baseball, professional basketball play-
ers turned to antitrust law to find relief from labor market re-
strictions such as the draft and limits on free agency. Oscar
Robertson, a Hall of Fame basketball player who also presided
over the players' union, filed a class action suit against the NBA
when his league arranged a merger with the American Basket-
ball Association (ABA).35 The ABA broke the NBA's monopsony
29 See, for example, Toolson v New York Yankees, Inc, 346 US 356, 357 (1953) (rely-
ing on Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore to dismiss an antitrust suit on the grounds
that baseball was "left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was not
subject to existing antitrust legislation").
30 See Flood v Kuhn, 407 US 258, 282 (1972) (noting that baseball's antitrust ex-
emption "is an aberration that has been with us now for half a century, one heretofore
deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has survived the
Court's expanding concept of interstate commerce").
31 See Kansas City Royals v Major League Baseball Players, 532 F2d 615, 617 (8th
Cir 1976).
32 See Major League Baseball Players Association v Garvey, 532 US 504, 505-07
(2001).
33 See Silverman v Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee, Inc, 67 F3d
1054, 1058 (2d Cir 1995).
34 See id at 1059, 1062.
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by luring away established players.36 However, the elimination
of the ABA meant the end of labor market competition for
players.37
After six years of settlement talks, the league and Robertson
reached an agreement to end the litigation.38 This was good for
the players. They did not have to strike or face a lockout during
negotiations. The league agreed to limit a team's perpetual hold
on a drafted player and loosen the player-compensation rule.39
The players accomplished more at the courthouse bargaining ta-
ble under the Sherman Act than they would have achieved at
the NLRA's collective bargaining table.
C. Football
Like their basketball counterparts, football players were
more successful in utilizing the Sherman Act than the NLRA. In
1987, football players used the NLRA to challenge similar labor
market restrictions by going on strike.40 Players objected to the
league's proposal to continue the compensation rule,41 which
provided that valuable players could not sign with another team
unless the acquiring team compensated the original team with a
player of equal value.42
The strike was a disaster for the players. After several
weeks, NFL teams resumed play by hiring replacement play-
ers.43 The NFL had a right to hire replacements due to the Su-
preme Court's seminal decision, National Labor Relations Board
v Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.44 During this era, numerous
employers-not just NFL teams-hired replacements for strik-
ers.45 Even the president tried his hand at replacing striking air
36 See id at 876 (explaining the plaintiffs' claim that a rival league provided players
an alternative market to the NBA's anticompetitive rules).
37 See id.
38 See Robertson v National Basketball Association, 72 FRD 64, 65-67 (SDNY
1976).
39 See Wood v National Basketball Association, 809 F2d 954, 957 (2d Cir 1987).
40 See Powell v National Football League, 764 F Supp 1351, 1354 (D Minn 1991).
41 See Powell v National Football League, 888 F2d 559, 561 (8th Cir 1989).
42 See Mackey v National Football League, 543 F2d 606, 610-11 (8th Cir 1976) (de-
tailing the provision that later became known as the Rozelle Rule).
43 See Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989
Duke L J 339, 403-04 (noting that many fans attended games involving replacement
players during the strike).
44 304 US 333, 345-46 (1938).
45 See Michael H. LeRoy, Employer Treatment of Permanently Replaced Strikers,
1935-1991: Public Policy Implications, 13 Yale L & Pol Rev 1, 1 n 5 (1995).
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traffic controllers a few years before the NFL used a similar
tactic. 46
Football players had miscalculated their odds of prevailing
in their strike. Over the next two decades, however, they turned
their defeat into victory. After the strike, the league implement-
ed its proposal to restrict free agency. 47 By this time, however,
the players had sued the NFL under the Sherman Act. The
Eighth Circuit in Powell v National Football League48 thought
that this lawsuit was not ripe for antitrust adjudication because
the league and players had other options to end their bargaining
impasse. 49
Powell unwittingly opened a new chapter in the relationship
between the players and the NFL. The court endorsed the NFL's
argument that the Sherman Act would apply, for example, if the
players ceased to be represented by a union.50 A month later, the
players effectively decertified their union.5' Eight individual
players challenged the NFL's restrictions on free agency as
Sherman Act violations.52 The NFL argued in response that the
union engaged in a sham decertification.53
But the district court ruled for the players. The fact that
the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) en-
gineered the loss of its majority status was irrelevant because a
formal NLRB decertification vote is not necessary for a union to
end its own bargaining authority.54 Thus, the NFL lost its anti-
trust exemption because it lacked an ongoing collective bargain-
ing relationship with the disbanded union.55 A jury ordered
damages.6 Facing more antitrust litigation, the NFL came to
terms with players in a comprehensive settlement of antitrust
claims.57
46 See United States v Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO),
525 F Supp 820, 822 (ED Mich 1981).
47 See McNeil v National Football League, 790 F Supp 871, 887 n 4 (D Minn 1992).
48 930 F2d 1293 (8th Cir 1989).
49 See id at 1302-03.
50 Id at 1303 n 12.
51 See Powell, 764 F Supp at 1354.
52 See generally McNeil v National Football League, 777 F Supp 1475 (D Minn
1991).
53 See Powell, 764 F Supp at 1354.
54 See id at 1358.
55 See McNeil, 790 F Supp at 883 n 14 (explaining that the labor exemption ended
when NFLPA representatives voted to end the union's existence).
56 McNeil v National Football League, 1992 WL 315292, *1 (D Minn).
57 See White v National Football League, 822 F Supp 1389, 1395 (D Minn 1993).
50 [81:44
7
LeRoy: How a Labor Dispute Would Help the NCAA
Published by Chicago Unbound, 2017
How a "Labor Dispute" Would Help the NCAA
For the following eighteen years, the NFL and the NFLPA
were not permitted to engage in regular collective bargaining.
Instead, a judge monitored their labor talks. The players gained
ground through this complex litigation:
[T]he 1993 settlement did achieve considerable benefits for
players whose careers had ended during the battle. For ex-
ample, all players' pensions, whether active or retired, were
retroactively increased by 40% as a result of the settlement.
Those who played prior to 1959 achieved their first pension.
Also, players who played in 1989 and thereafter have collec-
tively received $110 million in damages from the White set-
tlement. And, backpay checks from 1987, plus 60% interest,
were sent to 1987 strikers in November 1994 as a result of
the 1993 settlement. Thus, the NFLPA had again met its
commitment to all players, "past, present and future."58
As if to emphasize the futility of collective bargaining, the play-
ers' union recalls: "The 1993 settlement gained for the players
two things they had fought for but lost in previous bargaining
efforts: free agency, and a guaranteed percentage of the gross
revenues."69
Once the players settled their antitrust claims with the
NFL, they were required by the terms of the agreement to recer-
tify their union.60 This is a moment in sports history that calls
out to the NCAA today: a league that once resisted the estab-
lishment of a players' union realized over time that it has supe-
rior bargaining power under the NLRA but less leverage under
the Sherman Act. The 1993 settlement agreement was in effect
until it expired in 2011. Fearing a lockout, the players disband-
ed their union in order to bargain as class action plaintiffs in
federal court under the shelter of the Sherman Act.61
Forging ahead, the NFL imposed a bargaining lockout to
pressure the union into concessions. 62 Judge Susan Nelson in the
District of Minnesota enjoined the lockout. By her logic, "To pro-
pose, as the NFL does, that a labor dispute extends indefinitely
beyond the disclaimer of union representation is fraught with
58 NFL Players Association, History, online at https://www.nflplayers.com/About
-us/History (visited June 7, 2014).
59 Id (emphasis added).
60 See Brady v National Football League, 779 F Supp 2d 992, 1002 (D Minn 2011).
61 See id at 1003-04.
62 See id at 1004.
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peril."63 This view was short-lived. After a few months, the
Eighth Circuit vacated the injunction, prompting the NFL to re-
sume its lockout.64
What did the appeals court see that Judge Nelson missed? It
took a realistic view of the players' strategy to end their union:
"At that point, the parties were involved in a classic 'labor dis-
pute' by the Players' own definition."65 The court observed that
"the labor dispute did not suddenly disappear just because the
Players elected to pursue the dispute through antitrust litiga-
tion rather than collective bargaining."66 Emphasis is added be-
cause the Norris-LaGuardia Act forbids federal courts from issu-
ing an injunction, or otherwise asserting jurisdiction, in a labor
dispute.67 With this in mind, the appeals court reasoned: "This
dispute is between one or more employers or associations of em-
ployers (the League and the NFL teams) and one or more em-
ployees (the Players under contract). By the plain terms of the
Act, this case 'shall be held to involve or grow out of a labor
dispute."'68
D. Hockey
Like the other major sports, the National Hockey League
(NHL) had a longstanding practice of using a reserve clause to
spread talent among teams.69 Apart from a minor antitrust
case,70 courts typically have enjoined the NHL from enforcing its
reserve clause.7' The NHL did not qualify for the labor exemp-
tion because the league "was primarily responsible for devising
and perpetuating a monopoly over the product market of all pro-
fessional hockey players via the reserve system."72 The court de-
termined that the reserve clause violated the Sherman Act.73
63 Id at 1027.
64 See Brady v National Football League, 644 F3d 661, 680-81 (8th Cir 2011).
65 Id at 673.
66 Id (emphasis added).
67 See id at 673-74, citing 29 USC § 104.
68 Brady, 644 F3d at 671.
69 See Neeld v National Hockey League, 439 F Supp 446, 455 (WDNY 1977) ("Neeld
I"). See also generally Neeld v National Hockey League, 594 F2d 1297 (9th Cir 1979)
("Neeld II").
70 See generally Neeld I, 439 F Supp 446; Neeld II, 594 F2d 1297.
71 See, for example, Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc v Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc, 351 F Supp 462, 517-18 (ED Pa 1972).
72 Id at 500.
73 See id at 467.
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E. The End of Antitrust in Sports Labor Disputes?
This brief history reveals a series of paradoxes. To engender
competition among teams, professional sports leagues imple-
mented highly anticompetitive labor market rules, exemplified
by the reserve clause. Baseball evolved into a colossal commer-
cial success, but due to a quirky case with an extremely narrow
theory of interstate commerce, the sport remained exempt from
antitrust law. Later, in another paradox, basketball, football,
and hockey players formed unions under the NLRA for the pur-
pose of bargaining collectively with their employers, but they
abandoned this approach in favor of pursuing antitrust claims
after realizing they had weak bargaining power.
This particular paradox-epitomized by a union disbanding
in order to enhance its members' bargaining power as class ac-
tion plaintiffs in antitrust-probably ended when the Eighth
Circuit ruled that NFL players had no recourse under the
Sherman Act to enjoin a lockout. This ruling paved the way to a
quick settlement at the collective bargaining table.74 It also sent
a message to other leagues and players' unions to bargain their
differences under the NLRA rather than to pursue litigation un-
der the Sherman Act. For proof of this message, consider that
the NHL, with the similar goal of extracting player concessions,
engaged in a lockout.75 The same thing happened between the
NBA and its players when their collective bargaining agreement
expired.76 Did these players decertify their union and follow New
England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady's example of running
to federal court for an antitrust injunction? No. This is because
players understood that neither impasse nor decertification
marks the end of labor law and starting point for antitrust law.
Brady v National Football League7' makes clear that that im-
passe is simply another phase of the bargaining process that the
NLRA encompasses.
74 See Chris Deubert, Glenn M. Wong, and John Howe, All Four Quarters: A Retro-
spective and Analysis of the 2011 Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the Na-
tional Football League, 19 UCLA Enter L Rev 1 at 44-75 (2012).
75 See Katie Carrera, NHL Lockout: Owners, Players Reach Tentative Agreement on
CBA Framework, Capitals Insider (Wash Post Jan 6, 2013), online at
http://www.washingtonpost.comlblogs/capitals-insider/wp/2013/01/06/nhl-lockout-owners
-players-reach-tentative-agreement-on-cba-framework (visited June 7, 2014).
76 See Nathaniel Grow, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons from the NFL and
NBA Lockouts of 2011, 15 Vand J Enter & Tech L 473, 494-97 (2013).
77 644 F3d 661 (8th Cir 2011).
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II. HOW A "LABOR DISPUTE" WOULD HELP THE NCAA
A. The NCAA Patterns Itself after Professional Sports Leagues
The foregoing history is relevant to Division I football. Most
notably, each school is subject to a cap on scholarships.78 This
tends to allocate talent according to available openings. Players
cannot transfer without incurring a significant penalty.79 This
rule is like a restriction on free agency.
The NCAA has largely avoided antitrust enforcement to
date by proclaiming that its athletic competitions are on a high-
er ground than commerce.80 Its bylaws define players as "stu-
dent-athletes."81 Thus, Division I football players have consist-
ently lost antitrust lawsuits that challenged their immobility.82
Courts have told them they are not in a labor market.83 This ju-
dicial view is exposed as an absurdity, however, every time a TV
announcer, beat writer, or blog evaluates a player's potential to
play professional football. NCAA football is not only the NFL's
minor league-it is also the NFL's sole pipeline for talent.84
Where else do NFL scouts go to evaluate prospects? The union-
representation election at Northwestern may undermine the
NCAA's avoidance of antitrust scrutiny by exposing the business
side of Division I football.
78 See NCAA, 2013-14 NCAA Division I Manual Rule 15.5.6 at 207-08 (NCAA
2013), online at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf (visited
June 7, 2014).
79 See id at Rule 14.5.1 at 168-69.
80 See NCAA, Investing Where It Matters, NCAA.org Media Center, online at
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/investing-where-it-matters (visited
June 7, 2014) ("There is a lot of talk about how much money college sports generates.
But did you know that more than 90 percent of the NCAA's revenue goes to support stu-
dent-athletes?").
81 See NCAA, 2013-14 NCAA Division I Manual at xiv (cited in note 78).
82 See, for example, Banks v National Collegiate Athletic Association, 977 F2d 1081,
1094 (7th Cir 1992) (affirming the dismissal of a college football player's Sherman Act
lawsuit); Tanaka v University of Southern California, 252 F3d 1059, 1064-65 (9th Cir
2001) (affirming the dismissal of a student-athlete's Sherman Act claim over the NCAA
transfer rule).
83 See Banks, 977 F2d at 1090-91. The court said that the NCAA's loss-of-eligibility
rule for players who declare for the NFL draft is a "desirable and legitimate attempt 'to
keep university athletics from becoming professionalized to the extent that profit making
objectives would overshadow educational objectives."' Id at 1090, quoting National Col-
legiate Athletic Association v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85,
123 (1984) (White dissenting).
84 See Ben LeDoux, 5 NFL Players That Did Not Go to College, (Made Man Apr 3,
2010), online at http://www.mademan.com/mm/5-nfl-players-did-not-go-college.html (vis-
ited June 7, 2014).
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B. The NCAA Overestimates the Threat of Unionization
Unionization of college football players is not around the
corner. True, the NLRB representation election for Northwest-
ern players is a historic moment. As the following scenarios
show, however, the path to unionization is strewn with boulders.
While no one can predict the future of the unionization effort,
the possibilities are finite.
First, the unionization effort by the College Athletes Players
Association (CAPA) could end with a court ruling that North-
western University football players are not employees under the
NLRA. The regional director's decision conflicts with the Board's
precedent in Brown University and International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, UAW AFL-CIO.85 This case presented the question of
whether graduate students who served as teaching assistants as
part of their academic development may be considered school
employees under the NLRA. Because the students were in school
to pursue a degree, the Brown court ruled that they were not
employees under the NLRA. The court reasoned that "it simply
does not effectuate the national labor policy to accord them col-
lective bargaining rights."86 Certainly, Division I football players
are in a different situation than graduate assistants because
they are critical inputs for huge TV revenues. But again, the
unionization effort could end with a court ruling that applies
Brown to Northwestern University.
Second, a vote might show that less than a majority of play-
ers favor union representation. Northwestern's new quarterback
denounced the union.87 A "no" vote would push back this organ-
izing effort for at least one year due to an election bar in the
NLRA,88 or end it completely if the vote discourages organizers.
85 342 NLRB 483 (2004). The regional director's decision in Northwestern Universi-
ty, Employer, and College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), Petitioner, 2014 WL
1246914 (NLRB 2014), cited the long hours that players spend on football-fifty to sixty
hours per week-to distinguish players from the graduate students in Brown. See id at *16.
86 See Brown, 342 NLRB at 492.
87 See Eric Olson, Northwestern QB Says Players Should Have Taken Concerns to
Higher- Ups before Pushing for Union, US News & World Report (Apr 9, 2014), online at
http://www.usnews.com/news/sports/articles/20 14/04/09/northwestern-qb-says-union
-push-was-rushed-wrong (visited June 7, 2014).
88 See John D. Finerty Jr, One Year of Quiet: Honoring the Decision to Vote No, 11
Labor L 353, 355 (1995) (explaining that § 9(c)(3) of the NLRA prohibits an election for
one year after the date of balloting in a prior election).
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Third, if a majority favors union representation, CAPA
would be certified as the bargaining representative. Northwest-
ern would be required to bargain with the union over wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment.89 From there, a
wide variety of scenarios are possible, but three stand out as
more likely than others. First, Northwestern might bargain so
slowly that players could become frustrated and petition the
NLRB to decertify their union. This is not unprecedented.90 Sec-
ond, the school might reach an agreement with the union that is
patterned after the expanded-benefits model the NCAA is cur-
rently planning.9' Third, the school might bargain hard by offer-
ing players less than the NCAA model of expanded benefits for
nonunion programs. 92
Northwestern football players-who turned to the United
Steelworkers for organizing help,93 just as baseball players did
when they formed their union94-are likely to face steep obsta-
cles in collective bargaining. Do they have the same bargaining
power as MLB players? Would they have a visionary leader-a
skillful internal organizer who could keep a diverse group of
players together-as baseball players had in Major League
Baseball Players Association executive director Marvin Miller?96
Could they stare down senior administrators during contentious
negotiations at their prestigious school? Could they resist the
inevitable taunts that they are ruining college football? Could
they go to class regularly and make academic progress while
89 See NLRA § 8(d), 29 USC § 158(d).
90 For a comparable situation, see Mark Burnett Productions and Stephen R. Fred-
erick, Petitioner, and International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 349 NLRB
706, 706 (2007).
91 Steve Eder, N.C.A.A. Planning to Address Benefits for Some of Its Players, Offi-
cials Say, NY Times D4 (Apr 7, 2014).
92 For a comparison to the NFL's tough bargaining stance in 2011-which proposed
numerous player concessions-see Deubert, Wong, and Howe, 19 UCLA Enter L Rev at
44-75 (cited in note 74).
93 See Alejandra Cancino, Unions Get a Boost from Northwestern Athletes, Chicago
Tribune (Jan 30, 2014), online at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-30/site/ct
-college-athletes-organize-0130-biz--20 140130 1 labor-unions-football-players-united
-steelworkers (visited June 7, 2014).
94 MLBPA Info: Frequently Asked Questions, MLBPlayers.com, online at
http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp#created (visited June 7, 2014). For the relationship
between CAPA and the United Steelworkers, see CAPA, Press Release, Historic North-
western Football Players' Union Vote Is a Win-Win (Apr 25, 2014), online at
http://www.collegeathletespa.org/news/historic-northwestern-football-players (visited June
7, 2014).
95 For an explanation of Miller's role, see Paul D. Staudohar, Baseball Labor Rela-
tions: The Lockout of 1990, 113 Monthly Labor Rev 32, 32 (1990).
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embroiled in a sour and consuming labor negotiation? Could
they vote as a majority to strike? Could they faithfully walk a
picket line while Northwestern assembles a hasty walk-on crew
of replacement players? Could they continue to attend school if
their scholarships were held in abeyance pending the outcome of
a negotiation? These are the practical and legal implications of
forming a union and bargaining with an employer under the
NLRA.
However the future unfolds, there is no denying that players
have weak bargaining power. The players who are on track to
complete a degree would be reluctant to risk permanent re-
placement under Mackay Radio.96 Replacement could put them
at risk for losing their scholarships. The better players who
could be drafted or signed as free agents would be reluctant to
miss a shot at the NFL. More generally, it is hard to imagine a
freshman player mustering the courage to go on strike. It is
equally difficult to picture a senior risking the loss of part or all
of his last season. The five-year eligibility limit for players
means that the union would have less bargaining power than
the NFL players association-itself a weak union.
C. Antitrust Is a Larger Threat to the NCAA
College players might conclude that a better bargaining ta-
ble is available through an antitrust lawsuit.
First, every sports union at the major league level-except
baseball due to Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc v Na-
tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs"- successfully
used antitrust in its early history to compensate for their weak
bargaining power. A reasonable conjecture is that courts favored
players because teams were wealthy and players were paid little.
Consider this history: NBA players succeeded in their initial
antitrust litigation.98 Courts were also receptive to NFL players'
antitrust claims. Active and retired football players filed a
Sherman Act lawsuit in 1972 to challenge the NFL's Rozelle
Rule in Mackey v National Football League.99 Judge Earl Larson
agreed with the players, holding that the Rozelle Rule was an
antitrust violation because it deterred free agent signings.100 After
96 See 304 US at 345-46.
97 259 US 200 (1922).
98 See Part I.B.
9 407 F Supp 1000, 1002 (D Minn 1975).
100 Id at 1006-07.
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the Eighth Circuit affirmed the ruling,101 the NFL settled for $13
million in damages.102
Second, antitrust law can be used to certify the entire class
of Division I football players and overcome the fragmentation
problem under the NLRA. A possible blueprint for the players is
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litiga-
tion.103 Sam Keller, a former quarterback at Arizona State Uni-
versity, alleged that a video game developer exploited his like-
ness for commercial advantage.104 The litigation involves
former-not current-players, and the complaint involves player
publicity rights, which are unrelated to antitrust.os Nonetheless,
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness has nine named plain-
tiffs from major private and public Division I football and bas-
ketball programs, the class has been certified, the NCAA is a de-
fendant, and the lawsuit mirrors the efforts by CAPA to gain
more of the wealth that Northwestern University players gener-
ate. This complex litigation is on a favorable track for players.106
Third, while NCAA rules and bylaws differ from those in the
NFL, they have important linkages and similarities. The linkages
involve rules that make college players ineligible for further
NCAA participation.107 An example is a rule that strips scholar-
ships from players who declare for the NFL draft.108 The NFL's
reciprocal rule restricts a professional player's eligibility until
three years from the time his high school class graduates.109 In
other words, once a player finishes his junior season and de-
clares for the NFL draft, he cannot come back to an NCAA
school and reclaim his scholarship for a senior season if he is
disappointed with his selection or is undrafted. This rule linkage
has no connection to the educational mission espoused by the
NCAA; it simply implies that the NCAA and NFL allocate the
101 Mackey v National Football League, 543 F2d 606, 623 (8th Cir 1976).
102 See Brady v National Football League, 779 F Supp 2d 992, 998 (D Minn 2011).
103 724 F3d 1268 (9th Cir 2013).
104 Id at 1271.
105 See id. Keller filed a class action complaint alleging that the video game producer
violated his publicity rights under California Civil Code § 3344 and California common
law. Id at 1272.
106 See id at 1284 (rejecting the game producer's defense that the First Amendment
protects its use of the likenesses of college athletes).
107 See Sarah M. Konsky, Comment, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer
Rules, 70 U Chi L Rev 1581, 1602-03 (2003) (comparing NCAA transfer rules and penal-
ties to restrictions on professional employees).
108 See generally Banks, 977 F2d 1081.
109 See Clarett v National Football League, 369 F3d 124, 130 (2d Cir 2004).
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most talented football players in a way that limits their direct
competition with each other.
There are more similarities. Like the NFL, the NCAA has
its version of the reserve clause.11o If the player wants to move to
another team, he must sit for an entire season and forfeit one
year of eligibility."' This is a high price for mobility. A coach can
remove a player, however, or pressure him to quit.112 The player
has no recourse.
CONCLUSION
In a recent interview, the NCAA's president, Mark Emmert,
declared that unionization of college athletes is "grossly map-
propriate."113 He objected to the idea that student-athletes fit a
"union-employee model" because this type of relationship would
"throw away the entire collegiate model for athletics."114 But the
NCAA is blinded by wealth. Emmert made these comments dur-
ing the NCAA March Madness basketball tournament, which
earns the NCAA $10.8 billion in TV revenue.115
The NCAA assumes that it can successfully resist player ef-
forts to redistribute this wealth by winning the current legal
dispute before the NLRB. This is wishful thinking. Having pock-
eted billions of dollars in TV and related revenue from the labor
of football players, the NCAA has lost credibility by portraying
these players solely as college students. The fact that only 1-2
percent of these players actually perform in the NFL is beside
the point.116 This statistic implies nothing more than that the
NFL has too few player slots to hire the NCAA's output of talent.
110 See NCAA, 2013-14 NCAA Division I Manual Rule 14.5.1 at 168-69 (cited in
note 78).
"'I See id at Rule 14.5.1 at 168.
112 See, for example, Kate Hairopolous, SMU's Brown Trims 4 Players from Roster,
Dallas Morning News C11 (Apr 28, 2012).
113 Eddie Pells, NCAA President Mark Emmert: Unionization "Strikes Most Peo-
ple As ... Grossly Inappropriate," (Huffington Post Apr 6, 2014), online at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/06/mark-emmert-union n 5102239.html (visited
June 7, 2014).
114 Id.
115 NCAA, Press Release, CBS Sports, Turner Broadcasting, NCAA Reach 14-Year
Agreement (Apr 22, 2010), online at http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/2010-04
-21/cbs-sports-turner-broadcasting-ncaa-reach-14-year-agreement (visited June 7, 2014).
116 NCAA leaders use this statistic to argue that college athletes should retain their
amateur status. See, for example, Louanna Simon and Nathan Hatch, Why Unionizing
College Sports Is a Bad Call, Wall St J (Apr 7, 2014), online at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304441304579480013097853156
(visited June 7, 2014).
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The modest graduation rates for football players show that the
NCAA does not use football programs to elevate the academic
achievements of universities.117
Why shouldn't the NCAA encourage its member, North-
western University, to voluntarily recognize the players' union?
Even if the initial bargaining is limited to insurance and educa-
tional benefits, these would be mandatory subjects of bargaining
under the NLRA. By taking this course, the NCAA would im-
prove its chances of deflecting current and future lawsuits under
the doctrine of preemption.118 The NCAA would also follow the
NFL down the path of preserving its strong bargaining ad-
vantage. And in an antitrust lawsuit to challenge player com-
pensation and mobility restrictions, the NCAA would have a
proven defense to avoid antitrust jurisdiction: the same "labor
dispute" provision under the Norris-LaGuardia Act that defeat-
ed the NFL players in 2011,11 allowing the league to pocket
huge sums of money.
117 See Patrick James Rishe, A Reexamination of How Athletic Success Impacts
Graduation Rates: Comparing Student-Athletes to All Other Undergraduates, 62 Am J
Econ & Sociology 407, 415 (2003) (finding that the graduation rate of football players in
the freshman cohorts from 1988-91 at Division I schools was 52.46 percent).
118 For an example of how the NFL successfully shielded itself from a wrongful
death action, see Stringer v National Football League, 474 F Supp 2d 894, 909 (SD Ohio
2007) (arguing that its collective bargaining agreement preempted state claims under
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act). Current litigation includes In re Nation-
al Collegiate Athletic Association Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litigation, 2013 WL
6825602 (JPML) (involving former NCAA athletes in football, soccer, and hockey who
have sued over concussion injuries). See also generally Class Action Complaint, Arring-
ton v National Collegiate Athletic Association, No 1:11-cv-06356 (ND Ill filed Sept 12,
2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 4374451). The NCAA also faces a class action
lawsuit for failing to pay a scholarship shortfall. See Stefanie Mosca, NCAA Faces Law-
suit for Capping Athletic Scholarships, Inside Counsel (Summit Mar 11, 2014), online at
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/03/1 1/ncaa-faces-lawsuit-for-capping-athletic
-scholarshi (visited June 7, 2014).
119 See text accompanying notes 66-68.
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